日仏会館・フランス国立日本研究所（Umifre 19 フランス外務省・国立科学研究センター）

Speaker: Markus HECKEL (German Institute for Japanese Studies)
Moderator: Jean-Pascal BASSINO (French Research Institute on Japan - MFJ)

Abstract
This study focuses on the central bank independence and central bank transparency of the Bank of Japan and works on the research question of how the concept of central bank independence (including monetary policy making) is understood and executed in the Bank of Japan. The analysis includes the question if the Bank of Japan can be regarded as an independent central bank (de jure and de facto) considering the composition and appointment of its Monetary Policy Board members. This study starts with an analysis on central bank transparency (e.g. Geraats 2002; Eijffinger and Geraats 2006; Blinder et al. 2008), contributing to this research by adding the Bank of Japan as a case study. Comparisons with other main central banks (e.g. European Central Bank, US Federal Reserve System, Bank of England) are added to gain a broader understanding. Using the method of discourse analysis, this study seeks to illuminate the process of decision-making of the Bank of Japan’s Policy Board as one part of central bank independence, transparency and communication as well as their outcomes (in regards to monetary policy).